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Introduction
After the Cold War ended, the prospects of cooperative security seemed favourable for a few years. However, in spite of oppor-tunities, a rather strange disparity or asymmetry has evolved. 
While the political – and even the normative and socio-economic – goals 
of transformation were ubiquitously accepted, the idea of a European 
peace order vanished from the agenda.1 During the 1990s, a specific 
constellation of power materialised in the international system. What’s 
more, Russia was pushed to the side lines. The two rounds of eastward 
enlargement of NATO created an illusion of Western dominance and of 
its capability to project stability eastwards. Once the alliance started to 
extend its influence in ‘Europe-in-between’, i.e., the sphere between the 
European Union and post-Soviet Russia, such plans met Russian resist-
ance and came to a halt. 
The current international order is in transition, driven by the inter-
play of its main actors: Washington; Moscow; Beijing; and less signifi-
cantly, the European Union. Other emerging powers are also challeng-
ing the present arrangement and if successful, they will eventually create 
a multipolar global order. The transient international order is currently 
characterised by chronic instability, regional and global turmoil, and a 
dramatic decline in its ease of governance. 
The central question is whether the emerging multipolar order 
can provide security and welfare for the international community. Or, 
will we see protracted policies based on narrow definitions of national 
interest, undermining opportunities for trust and confidence-building 
among the driving forces of the transformation process? Are we bound 
to reawaken memories of the bipolar, Cold War era, with its proxy wars 
that instrumentalised domestic and regional conflicts for external pur-
poses? 
The chances of reforming and democratising the United Nations 
are rather slim. Mutual trust and consensus over the essential chal-
lenges facing the world’s chief international actors are missing.2 The 
breakdown of trust and confidence, which, despite severe challenges, 
1 Parts of this paper are based on an enhanced contribution titled ‘A world in transition: 
Views from Russia, the US, and the EU on the challenges of Multipolarity’ in Schulze 
(2018).
2 Studies by the National Intelligence Council (NIC) on how the world will change in 
the coming decades and how the US position will be affected were already presented 
in 2009 and 2012, to the Obama Administration. See Global Trends 2030: Alternative 
Worlds (2012). In February 2017, a new Global Trends report was presented to the 
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had lasted from the demise of the USSR, has catapulted Europe into the 
midst of conflicts aggravated by inherently self-inflected contradictions.
The opening two decades of the new millennium has seen funda-
mental changes in the constellation of power among international ac-
tors. Those changes affected Europe and will further determine oppor-
tunities to establish a peace and security order for the whole continent. 
Let me outline a few interlinked factors that have contributed to the 
present situation: 
1. The hegemony of the US has proved to be temporary; Pre-
dictions from both the CIA and the National Intelligence 
Council (NIC) see the US as a major military actor through 
to 2030, although with a weakened economic and financial 
foundation. In order to act as a global Hegemon in future, 
Washington needs to safeguard existing alliances and/or seek 
new and loyal partners that can offer assistance and are ready 
for burden-sharing.
2. Russia has returned from the cold and become an interna-
tional player again. State authority has been restored after the 
chaotic decade of the 1990s. Moscow has formulated its for-
eign policy objectives based on a tripartite approach to seek 
balanced, pragmatic, and cooperative relations with Wash-
ington, Beijing, and Brussels. 
 In 2008, Moscow initiated a debate on a ‘Pan-European Se-
curity Architecture’ to overcome the division of Europe into 
different zones of security. The debate linked domestic issues 
with international cooperation. The then Russian president, 
Dmitry Medvedev, focused on Russian modernisation in 
terms of innovation, investment, infrastructure, and govern-
ance. Modernisation was the catchword, sounding, in a way, 
like Perestroika and Glasnost of the Gorbachev era. 
 But the Russian initiative did not generate any positive result 
among Western powers. A year later, using a bilateral plat-
form with Berlin, Medvedev and Chancellor Merkel agreed 
on a new peace and security project, formulating the Mese-
berg Memorandum of June 2010. 
 The Meseberg Memorandum tried to replicate a pre-existing 
approach to dialogue between NATO and Russia in EU-Rus-
sia relations. Just as with the earlier initiative, NATO mem-
bers refused to deal with the new process. Both projects were 
buried in commissions – like Corfu Process – and taken off 
the agenda. 
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3. The failure to establish a conflict-prevention and manage-
ment centre in EU-Russian relations already indicated a shift 
of paradigm in the Russian and Eastern policy of the EU, 
which occurred somewhere between 2008 and 2010. The 
change was from a cooperation to confrontation. 
 The twofold objectives were the essence of the paradigm shift: 
Firstly, to isolate Russia in Europe, and secondly, to under-
mine the dominant position of Berlin in formulating the EU’s 
Russia policy.
4. An anti-Russian coalition of member states was formed, and 
to be successful they needed to undermine Berlin’s leadership 
in the EU’s Russia policy. From 1991 until 2009, the EU bor-
rowed a formula for its Eastern policy which was very much 
linked to German Ostpolitik. For nearly 20 years, Berlin’s 
economic and political predominance in nearly all aspects of 
EU-Russia relations compensated for Brussels’ lack of stra-
tegic orientation as to what to do with Russia. Pragmatic 
partnership and cooperation at all levels of economic, social, 
political, and cultural life was the core idea. This concept even 
worked miraculously to defuse the negative consequences of 
the Russia-Georgia war in 2008. 
5. Reluctantly, and without a solid consensus or a coherent strat-
egy among member states, the European Union was pushed 
into a geopolitical role by conflicts and consequences of state 
failures in its ‘near-abroad’, i.e., in ‘Europe-in–between’ and in 
the Mediterranean area. 
 Given the conflicting and unstable conditions in the area be-
tween Europe’s two geopolitical power blocs, one may only 
speculate as to whether the presence of security institutions, 
as proposed at Meseberg, would have contained the dangers 
of confrontation and prevented the war in Ukraine. 
6. As a result, by 2012 a notable shift in the Russian foreign pol-
icy paradigm had already slowly commenced. The Kremlin 
simply lost hope of once again being accepted as a partner 
by Western powers and sought after alternatives in Asia and 
other emerging countries.
7. Shifts in the global economy and emerging growth centres like 
China, the G20, and generally the BRICS strengthened such 
expectations in Moscow. The policy shift toward a multipolar 
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8. An icy relationship developed in EU-Russia and NATO-Rus-
sia relations from 2012. The danger of a new Cold War is writ-
ten on the wall. There is no comfort in the fact that the new 
Cold War differs fundamentally from the old one. Reciprocal 
political accusations have pushed aside the central issues of 
what Europe’s role and position in the globalised world will 
be and whether there is any chance of a pan-European secu-
rity arrangement. The division of Europe is at issue again; this 
may even be desirable for some governments.
9. The Ukraine conflict which haunts Europe today is multi-
layered. It is not only a military conflict of intervention, sepa-
ratism, and annexation but it also portrays signs of a societal 
crisis. More than two decades into transformation, the results 
of building a modern Ukrainian state, based on enduring 
economic growth, political stability, checks and balances, le-
gitimacy, the rule of law, identity, and welfare for the people, 
are not very convincing. Ukraine’s lingering systemic crisis 
has been brought to light by the catastrophic consequences of 
war, secessionist movements, political polarisation, and refu-
gees, as well as by financial and economic decline. The war 
has simply deepened and sharpened underlying trends.
Dim chances for a breakthrough in European security
Indeed, since 2016, several jarring game-changers have troubled 
the international system, with consequences for European and global 
stability. In addition, Brexit has weakened the EU’s main instrument of 
persuasion and soft power influence. The victory of Emmanuel Macron 
in the French presidential elections and the landslide success of his En 
Marche! movement in the parliamentary elections was met with trium-
phant enthusiasm from political establishments in Brussels, Paris, and 
Berlin. But two years later, such an unquestionably positive develop-
ment has been offset by domestic developments in France and European 
fatigue. A dynamic rebirth of leadership between Berlin and Paris has 
not materialised. 
Hopes of a game-changer effect to kick-start the EU restructuring 
process, enhance its geopolitical influence, and promote a comprehensive 
order for peace, security, and welfare on the continent are not in sight. 
The unpredictability caused by political fragmentation and the rise of 
nationalist forces in many EU member states offers little optimism for 
advances in EU restructuring. Nor are there grounds to expect Brussels 
to formulate resolute policy towards Europe’s eastern neighbours 
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independently of US objectives. Furthermore, it remains doubtful that 
Brussels will influence the shape of the emerging global order, given the 
present state of the European Union – fragmented by uncontrollable 
external challenges and home-grown problems which have been 
eroding EU solidarity since 2009. 
There have, however, been positive indications. Amidst challeng-
ing external and internal trends, in June 2016 the European Union at-
tempted to define its place and its responsibilities within the shifting 
context of the international system (Council of the European Union, 
2016). The Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe strategy 
report is less a forecast or projection of what the future holds, and more 
a document of assertiveness and re-affirmation to stem the tide of drain-
ing internal cohesion and to unify the EU against external challenges. 
Missing from the report are instruments and conceptual frameworks 
capable of repairing internal fragmentation, regaining trust, building 
solid consensus for political action, and meeting external threats to the 
south (migration) and the east (Ukraine).
It is doubtful the global strategy will propel the EU along the path 
of sovereignty and autonomy in security.3 US opposition to a stronger 
EU component within NATO reveals the futility of attempting to rec-
oncile the historically subtle rivalry between NATO and EU objectives. 
Accordingly, the formation of European foreign, security, and defence 
activity, apart from and distinct to NATO, has been difficult to realise. 
Declining US hegemony
As Global Trends repeatedly stressed, the US will operate as a rec-
ognised regional Hegemon within its sphere of influence. Brzezinski’s 
characterisation of a power bloc consisting of the US and the EU re-
mains a reality, resting on a dense network of militarily, political, and 
economic institutions, such as NATO, notably, as well as a plethora of 
agencies and NGOs operating from within and below constituent states. 
Obliged by its weakening global status, the US is doomed to follow a 
status-quo policy that aims to prevent its position from deteriorating 
further. 
Paradoxically, despite its unpredictability and confused foreign 
policy actions, the Trump administration seems to have understood the 
3 See also Zbigniew Brzezinski (2004, p. 95). Brzezinski sees no signs of a political ri-
valry between the US and the EU. He views the EU as too bureaucratic and too dis-
united, and therefore incapable of matching the military-political strength of the US. 
For him, the EU resembles a giant economic conglomerate and he sarcastically adds, 
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writing on the wall. Declaring that the time of the free ride for European 
security is over, the Trump administration has reversed the asymme-
try between economic development and security which helped West-
ern Europe to its favourable economic status from the early 1960s. The 
formula was simple and worked well for both sides: Europe delegated 
its security needs to the US, accepting its leadership; and the US ac-
cepted unrestricted economic development for Europe. The equation 
was questioned when the US slid into economic and financial troubles. 
Ever since, the call for burden-sharing has been on the agenda.
The sharing of military costs – 2% of GDP for defence – and trade 
restrictions, even a looming trade war, are the prices the EU must pay. 
This US-dominated power formula will work as long as the conflicts in 
Ukraine and Eastern Europe are not resolved. However, those conflicts 
are interlinked with international issues. In this respect, they will re-
main unresolved as long as there is no consensus among major players 
about the diffusion of power and positions in the emerging new world 
order. For Europe, Russia and the US are the primary actors in this con-
flict. And due to the new hybrid form of this conflictual relationship, 
US-Russia relations cannot be expected to improve in the near future. 
If one follows Karaganov’s line of argument, relations between Russia 
and the US “are worse than ever since the 1950s and the Cuban missile 
crisis” (Karaganov, 2018).
Europe, and the EU, is sandwiched between the conflicting ma-
jor powers, Russia and the US. Even if a major restructuring of the EU 
gained momentum towards the creation of a homogeneous Core Eu-
rope, able to define and project foreign and security priorities as well as 
to build defence capabilities, the EU would be a respected and recog-
nised mediator of peaceful settlements rather than a major geopolitical 
actor, capable of globally significant power-projection.
The present situation does not allow such optimism. As the weak-
est link in the chain of competing great powers, the EU is not even in a 
position to choose options for security and alliances. Referring to theo-
ries of neoclassical realism, the weaker player in a given power constel-
lation generally has three options: 
- Firstly, to bandwagon with the most powerful state. This would 
be, in our case, the US.
- Secondly, to remain neutral. This is the best option and guaran-
tees a higher degree of sovereignty. 
- Thirdly, to establish a counter-balance against the Hegemon 
with other states. Momentarily, this option is being pursued in 
an unconvincing manner, because resistance from pro-Atlanti-
cist member states in the EU is high. 
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Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), or the renewed 
debate on Core Europe and the Common Security and Defence Pol-
icy (CSDP), points in a hopeful direction, but the realisation of both 
projects is extremely difficult and a slow process. Nevertheless, Berlin 
should put more effort into approaching member states to put the Part-
nership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Russia on the table 
again.
Paradoxically, the present policy of the Trump Administration 
could speed up both projects. Unintentionally, the peculiar and unpre-
dictable behaviour of the US administration has opened a window of 
opportunity for Brussels to define ‘European interests’ as distinctive 
from Washington’s. The Trump Administration shies away from di-
rect military interventions, a process which had already started under 
Obama. Instead it uses economic sanctions, combined with legal ac-
tions, as potent soft power instruments to keep alliances under control. 
Allied partners which cross lines are economically and politically pun-
ished. 
This kind of policy makes sense for a former Hegemon that can no 
longer maintain its global position by pure military means. However, it 
undermines the power equation between the US and all stages of Euro-
pean integration, which has lasted since the beginning of the Cold War. 
The US has historically been accepted as, politically and militarily, the 
undisputed guarantor of European security and the leader of the West-
ern bloc, institutionalised in NATO. Given the nuclear security guar-
antees to the European member states, the EEC and then the EU were 
able to develop their economic soft power capabilities without major 
economic and political dissent from the US.
The Trump Administration has dramatically changed the ‘security 
for economic recovery and growth’ equation that kept the Atlantic com-
munity so closely interlaced for decades. The consequences of the sanc-
tions regimes against Russia and Iran, in combination with the cancella-
tion of treaties, is affecting the core of the Atlantic relationship.
Brzezinski’s characterisation of a power bloc consisting of the US 
and the EU is still in operation but the links are getting weaker. There 
are chances for a political emancipation of Europe from Washington, 
but this would be a long and difficult process. Furthermore, such a pro-
cess needs collective leadership and a robust consensus among the EU’s 
main member states. Both factors are missing. Neither Berlin nor Paris 
are in any condition to provide leadership or a vision of a common Eu-
ropean security agenda. As long as the Ukraine crisis is unresolved in 
a satisfactory and face-saving way for both sides, any attempt to bal-
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and military ways would be sternly resisted by the pro-Atlanticist camp 
within the EU.
Some recommendations for the reconstitution 
of a common security dialogue
There is no illusion in Moscow that Germany will veer off the 
course of NATO and will hunt for a new and dominant role in formulat-
ing and shaping the EU’s Eastern and Russia policy. In this matter, the 
former role of German Ostpolitik would be an essentially potent instru-
ment of understanding and bridging gaps, but the political leadership is 
missing and there is no indication among the new coalition government 
that Berlin is willing to embark on such a risky path. 
Europe sees widespread use of formulas of the past – that there is 
‘no security in Europe possible without or against Russia’ and that of a 
possible Europe ‘from Lisbon to Vladivostok’ – which, although desir-
able, lack any practical meaning. As Andrey Kortunov (2018) piercingly 
points out, “To cut it short, there are absolutely no reasons to hope for 
any breakthrough in German-Russian relations just because a new coa-
lition government has finally arrived at Berlin”.4 What Kortunov has also 
addressed is the contradiction Berlin faces when the goal of renewed 
Russian relations has to hide behind the slogan that ‘there should be 
no special relationship between Russia and Germany’. In addition, there 
is the ubiquitous German mantra that ‘Germany’s foreign policy, espe-
cially that directed towards Russia, must be embedded in a European 
framework’. 
However, Berlin can neither deny nor escape its centuries-long his-
toric relationship and position with regard to Russia. Even during the 
Cold War era, it was Bonn which started the process of normalisation 
and the undoing of the division of Europe that finally ended in German 
reunification. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Eu-
rope (OSCE) was the crucial instrument in bringing down the Wall and, 
for some time at least, preventing the reawakening of Cold War ghosts. 
Given that legacy, there is no other country more interested in stability, 
security, and peace in Europe, including Russia. Moscow may have lost 
Germany for the moment, but the cultural, historical, and political ties 
may prove more potent in the future in overcoming the present stale-
mate.
4 One could even project this gloomy statement into the future: indicators predict a 
Black/CDU/CSU and Green Coalition government after the next parliamentary elec-
tions in 2021. Given the negative attitude of the Green party toward Russia, the chanc-
es for improvement German-Russian relations are not very promising. 
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Recommendations
The central issue for a renewal of Europe-Russia relations is the 
resolution of the Ukraine crisis. Let me propose a few ideas: 
- Firstly, Germany should take a more active position on 
Ukraine, along the lines already marked out by former foreign 
ministers Steinmeier and Gabriel. It is very unlikely, given the 
desolate relationship between the US and Russia, that any posi-
tive initiative will come from either Moscow or Washington. 
As long as the Ukraine conflict is simmering, the US will have 
enough leverage to contain and even stop any EU member state 
from leaving the sanctions regime. However, the US would not 
be able to act against Berlin if Berlin succeeded in forming a 
coalition of member states to gradually eliminate the sanction 
regime. It is of the utmost necessity that Berlin acts carefully 
to form such a coalition in the name of protecting ‘European’ 
interests and sovereignty.
- Secondly, linked with such a move, Berlin should bring its en-
ergy to bear on reconstructing the defunct PCA (Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreement) between the EU and Russia. A 
starting point could be the four dimensions of the 2003 Saint 
Petersburg agreement and a decision to liberalise the visa re-
gime.
- Thirdly, Berlin should look beyond the malfunctioning NATO-
Russia Council. Germany should either work towards meetings 
and operative cooperation on a permanent and sustainable ba-
sis and/or enhance the Council’s relevance by creating an at-
taché or incorporated crisis management group to deal with 
future possible threats and challenges. Possibly a closer sharing 
of information and on-the-spot cooperation between NATO 
and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) would 
be an objective worth striving for.
- Fourthly, Berlin should throw its political weight and economic 
interests into the ring to establish a common basis for econom-
ic cooperation between the EU and the Eurasian Economic 
Union (EEU). Here again, a modified PESCO related to the 
economic cooperation of interested member states could break 
the ice.
- Fifthly, Berlin should support the enforcement of the Minsk II 
agreement. One-sided accusations against Moscow are coun-
terproductive; a big step forward towards a peaceful settlement 
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tiations about UN peacekeeping forces in the Donbass area 
to protect civilians and to deescalate war-like action on both 
sides. Berlin must use a carrot and stick policy towards Kiev 
if necessary. In this context, the role of the OSCE must be 
strengthened. 
- Sixthly, what has almost been lost in the debate are the treaties 
and arrangements from the Cold War era on arms reduction. 
What is especially important is the prevention of any attempts 
towards a new arms race in Europe: With the Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces Treaty/INF practically gone, a potential 
conventional and even nuclear arms race followed by instability 
and civil discontent are threatening the peace in Europe. 
- Paradoxically, there is little doubt that any of these ideas are on 
the table or being pursued in the design of Germany’s present 
foreign policy. These actions could contribute to a thawing of 
currently antagonistic narratives that are blocking steps for-
ward. In addition to political leadership and consensus-build-
ing activities, the vision and the endurance needed to shape 
Europe’s security future will be crucial. 
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